New York Times paywall: round-up of the analysis

Nieman Journalism Labs’ Tom Coddington has a great round-up of the decision by the New York Times to introduce a pay-wall:

There were a couple pieces written supporting the Times’ proposal: Former CBS digital head Larry Kramer said he’d be more likely to pay for the Times than for the tablet publication The Daily, even though it’s far more expensive. The reason? The Times’ content has consistently proven to be valuable over the years. (Tech blogger John Gruber also said the Times’ content is much more valuable than The Daily’s, but wondered if it was really worth more than five times more money.) Nate Silver of Times blog FiveThirtyEight used some data to argue for the Times’ value.

The Times’ own David Carr offered the most full-throated defense of the pay plan, arguing that most of the objection to it is based on the “theology” of open networks and the free flow of information, rather than the practical concerns involved with running a news organization. Reuters’ Felix Salmon countered that the Times has its own theology — that news orgs should charge for content because they can, and that it will ensure their success. Later, though, Salmon ran a few numbers and posited that the paywall could be a success if everything breaks right.

There were more objections voiced, too: Both Mathew Ingram of GigaOM and former newspaper journalist Janet Coats both called it backward-looking, with Ingram saying it “seems fundamentally reactionary, and displays a disappointing lack of imagination.” TechDirt’s Mike Masnick ripped the idea that people might have felt guilty about getting the Times for free online.

One of the biggest complaints revolved around the Times’ pricing system itself, which French media analyst Frederic Filloux described as “expensive, utterly complicated, disconnected from the reality and designed to be bypassed.”Others, including Ken Doctor, venture capitalist Jean-Louis Gassee, and John Gruber, made similar points about the proposal’s complexity, and Michael DeGusta said the prices are just too high. Poynter’s Damon Kiesow disagreed about the plan structure, arguing that it’s well-designed as an attack on Apple’s mobile paid-content dominance.

 

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Where to next for the Google Book Settlement?

This week a US judge ruled against the Google Book Settlement, the latets in a seven year legal saga that I’ve covered in some depth here.

Jerry Brito has a good explainer of the background of the case:

In mid-2005, the Author’s Guild and the American Association of Publishers filed suit to stop Google from scanning any more books. Soon the Author’s Guild’s case was certified as a class-action lawsuit, meaning that anyone who had ever published a book—millions of authors—would be part of the class represented and would be bound by the result of the case.

An Unsettling Settlement

Three years later, after extensive negotiations, the parties announced they had reached a settlement. Google would pay $125 million up front and would then be allowed to continue scanning books and making them available online. More importantly, Google would be allowed to offer not just snippets, but it would be allowed to sell entire text of books as well. The copyright holder would get about 2/3 of the revenues and Google would keep 1/3.

On its surface, the proposed settlement was a boon for all involved. Google would get to continue digitizing books, authors and publishers would get a cut of the profits, and consumers would get universal access to almost all of the world’s books. But reading between the lines, the settlement proved to be problematic.

Because it was a settlement to a class-action lawsuit, it meant that all authors who had ever published a book were bound. Google could scan any book without first asking for permission. If an author didn’t want his book to be scanned or included in Google’s database, he had to contact Google and opt-out. This would have turned copyright on its head.

As a result, many authors protested. The Author’s Guild and the publisher’s association had negotiated on behalf of millions of authors, and many felt the deal didn’t represent their wishes. Almost 7,000 authors wrote to the court asking to be removed from the lawsuit’s plaintiff class.

Saving the Orphans

Another contentious aspect of the settlement was how it treated “orphan works,” books the authors of which are unknown or can’t be found. It’s a well-known problem in copyright that members of Congress have tried to fix several times.

The problem is that if a company like Google wants to digitize a copyrighted book, and it can’t find its author to ask for permission, then its choices are 1) scan the book anyway and face heavy penalties if the author surfaces later and sues, or 2) leave the book undigitized and out of a universal library. As a result, hundreds of thousands of books are in a kind of limbo, not accessible to readers even if the author may well have been fine with digitization.

The Google Books settlement presented a solution to the problem. Because it bound all authors—-known and unknown—-Google could proceed to scan orphan works without having to worry. If an author later surfaced who didn’t want his book used, he could no longer sue Google. He could opt-out of the program and claim a check for the revenues associated with his book, but no more.

Some welcomed this solution to the problem, but others, including the Department of Justice, pointed out to the court that it would give Google a monopoly over orphan works. Because the settlement would only apply to Google, if another party like Amazon or the Internet Archive wanted to create its own digital library that included orphan works, it would not get the same protection.

And it wouldn’t be easy for other to get the same deal. Short of Congressional action, the only way a company like Amazon could get similar treatment would be to settle a class action suit of their own—a very difficult and time-consuming set of events to replicate. Additionally, because the authors and publishers who negotiated the Google deal are getting a cut of revenue, some have suggested that it would be in their interest to make sure Google remained a monopoly and would therefore not settle as easily with other parties.

What’s Next

Because class-action lawsuits can be as controversial as this one, the law requires that a court approve a settlement before it becomes binding. The court accepted over 500 briefs from various parties supporting or opposing the settlement and early last year held a hearing on the fairness of the settlement. It rejected the case yesterday.

The options available now to Google and the authors and publishers are:

  1. Continue litigating the original lawsuit, which is an unlikely scenario.
  2. Amend the settlement to make it opt-in, meaning that authors would have to give permission before their books are scanned.
  3. Appeal the judge’s decision to a higher court.

Judge Chin seemed to invite a new settlement, saying in his opinion that “Many of the concerns raised in the objections would be ameliorated if the [settlement] were converted from an ‘opt-out’ settlement to an ‘opt-in’ settlement.”

In the New York Times, Robert Darnton, himself a librarian and a strident if highly-0informed critic of the deal, weighed in with this opinion piece:

This decision is a victory for the public good, preventing one company from monopolizing access to our common cultural heritage.

Nonetheless, we should not abandon Google’s dream of making all the books in the world available to everyone. Instead, we should build a digital public library, which would provide these digital copies free of charge to readers. Yes, many problems — legal, financial, technological, political — stand in the way. All can be solved.

The Chronicle of Higher Education carries a good interview with Pamela Samuelson:

It’s the only ruling really that the judge, I think, could have made. The settlement was so complex, and it was so far-reaching. With the Department of Justice and the governments of France and Germany stridently opposed to the settlement, it seems to me that the judge really didn’t have all that much choice. So the ultimate ruling, that the settlement is not fair, reasonable, and adequate to the class, is one that I think was inevitable.

The thing that surprised me about the opinion was that he took seriously the issues about whether the Authors Guild and some of its members had adequately represented the interests of all authors, including academic authors and foreign authors. That was very gratifying because I spent a lot of time crafting letters to the judge saying that academic authors did have different interests. Academic authors, on average, would prefer open access. Whereas the guild and its members, understandably, want to do profit maximization.

The EFF’s Corynne McSherry has this analysis:

On the policy front, the court recognized – as do we – the extraordinary potential benefits of the settlement for readers, authors and publishers. We firmly believe that the world’s books should be digitized so that the knowledge held within them can made available to people around the world. But the court also recognized that the settlement could come at the price of undermining competition in the marketplace for digital books, giving Google a de facto monopoly over orphan books (meaning, works whose owner cannot be located). The court concluded that solving the orphan works problem is properly a matter for Congress, not private commercial parties. Sadly, Congress has thus far lacked the will to do so. Perhaps yesterday’s decision will finally spur Congress to revisit this important issue and pass comprehensive orphan works legislation, that allows for mass book digitization.

That said, the court also got some things fundamentally wrong in its copyright analysis. For example, it states that “a copyright owner’s right to exclude others from using his property is fundamental and beyond dispute” and then proceeds to quote at length from the letters of numerous authors (and their descendants) who share the misguided notion that a copyright is, by definition, an exclusive right to determine how a work can be used. We respectfully disagree. Copyright law grants to authors significant powers to manage exploitation of creative works as a function of spurring the creation of more works, not as a natural or moral right. And those powers are subject to numerous important exceptions and limitations, such as the first sale and fair use doctrines. Those limits are an essential part of the copyright bargain, which seeks to encourage the growth and endurance of a vibrant culture by both rewarding authors for their creative investments and ensuring that others will have the opportunity to build on those creative achievements. Thus, as the Supreme Court has explained, such limits are “neither unfair nor unfortunate” but rather “the means by which copyright advances the progress of science and art.” If the legal issues raised in the underlying lawsuit are ever litigated on the merits, let’s hope this or any future judge keeps the traditional American copyright bargain firmly in mind.

Michael Liedtke of the Associated Press thinks this is a micvrocosm of the larger anti-turst and monopoly challenges facing Google:

This week’s ruling from U.S. Circuit Judge Denny Chin did more than complicate Google’s efforts to make digital copies of the world’s 130 million books and possibly sell them through an online book store that it opened last year. It also touched upon antitrust, copyright and privacy issues that are threatening to handcuff Google as it tries to build upon its dominance in Internet search to muscle into new markets.

“This opinion reads like a microcosm of all the big problems facing Google,” said Gary Reback, a Silicon Valley lawyer who represented a group led by Google rivals Microsoft Corp. andAmazon.com Inc. to oppose the digital book settlement.

Google can only hope that some of the points that Chin raised don’t become recurring themes as the company navigates legal hurdles in the months ahead.

The company is still trying to persuade the U.S. Justice Department to approve a $700 million purchase of airline fare tracker ITA Software nearly nine months after it was announced. Regulators are focusing its inquiry into whether ITA would give Google the technological leverage to create an unfair advantage over other online travel services. Google argues it will be able to provide more bargains and convenience for travellers if it’s cleared to own ITA’s technology.

In Europe and the state of Texas, antitrust regulators are looking into complaints about Google abusing its dominance of Internet search to unfairly promote its own services and drive up its advertising prices.

And Google is still trying fend off an appeal in another high-profile copyright case, one stemming from its 2006 acquisition of YouTube, the Internet’s leading video site. Viacom Inc. is seeking more than $1 billion in damages after charging YouTube with misusing clips from Comedy Central, MTV and other Viacom channels. A federal judge sided with Google, saying YouTube had done enough to comply with digital copyright laws in its early days.

One of my favourite comentators on Google is of course the one-and-only Siva Vaidhyanathan, who is quoted in this excellent Inside Higher Ed piece:

Siva Vaidhyanathan, a media studies professor at the University of Virginia and a notable Google gadfly, said the company overplayed its hand by essentially trying to rewrite the rules governing the copying and distribution of book content through a class-action settlement. “Google clearly flew too close to the sun on this one,” he wrote in an e-mail. “…This is not what class-action suits and settlements are supposed to do.”

Vaidhyanathan said that Google now faces the choice of either continuing to fight for its interpretation of copyright law in the courts or scaling back its plans for a digital bookstore. “If Google decides to take the modest way out, it can still ask Congress to make the needed changes to copyright law that would let Google and other companies and libraries compete to provide the best information to the most people,” the media scholar says. “Congress should have been the place to start this in the first place.”

 

 

 

 

Jenna Newman on the Google book settlement

In the 1st issue for 2011 of the journal Scholarly and Research Communication comes a masterful exploration of the cultural and legal issues surrounding the Google book settlement by Jenna Newman. At 75 pages, this monograph-length essay is probably the most comprehensive and certainly the most current exploration of the issues underlying this giant experiment in digital publishing.

It’s not really possible to sum up the entire essay, so I’ll just cut to the chase and quote from her conclusion, which firstly establishes in extraordinary detail just how good the deal is for Google:

If the settlement is approved, Google can congratulate itself on a particularly excellent deal. It avoids years of uncertainty, not to mention ongoing legal fees, in litigation. It avoids prohibitive transaction costs by not having to clear rights individually for the works it has scanned already and all the works covered by the settlement and yet unscanned. It will receive a blanket licence to use a broad swath of copyrighted works, and it will enjoy an exclusive position, both as a market leader and with legal peace of mind, in the realm of digital rights: its private licence goes much further than current copyright legislation, particularly with respect to orphan works, for which rights are currently unobtainable in any market. Low transaction costs and legal certainty are key requirements for any mass digitization or digital archiving project (McCausland, 2009). The settlement offers both, to Google and Google alone. It will be years ahead of any potential competitors digitizing print works and may easily end up with an effective monopoly and a leading stake in the emerging markets for digital books. And all this costs Google only U.S.$125 million—a mere 0.53% of its gross revenue, or 1.92% of its net income, for 2009 alone (Google Inc., 2010b)

Newman suggests that th deal is far more equivocal for publishers and authors, but that given the other options on the table (including the risk of a music-industry style failure to establish a viable digital publishing platform until after piracy has eroded much of the value of the market), it may represent the “best deal available.”

But the real implications are for copyright law and communications policy:

The settlement may serve publishers’ and authors’ individual or immediate interests even as it erodes their collective and long-term ones. The public, too, has a significant vested interest in the subjects of the settlement—the books themselves, repositories to centuries of knowledge and creativity—as well as the legal and cultural environment the settlement endorses. A detailed account of the settlement’s economic and cultural costs and benefits is instructive, but more importantly the settlement highlights the structural and technological deficiencies of existing copyright law. Long copyright terms and the presumption of total rights protection have created a copyright regime that privileges the potential for commercial exploitation regardless of whether that exploitation is feasible or even desired by the creators themselves. This regime is also particularly ill equipped to recognize digital possibilities. Whatever happens to this settlement, such tensions continue to strain copyright’s rules.

A number of conditions on approval could address criticisms of the settlement, but perhaps the best way to ensure Google, publishers, and authors are all treated fairly is to pursue copyright reform, not private contracts, to address the legislative problems that the settlement tries to engage. Legislative changes with respect to intellectual property rights have been slow to reflect everyday technological realities. The existence of the settlement, and much of its reception, demonstrates that private interests and public appetites are eager to move beyond the limits of the current regulations. Copyright reform will be fraught with challenges of its own, but the existing legal framework—in Canada as in the U.S.—is increasingly inadequate for accommodating common and emerging practices and capabilities: copyright law has swung out of balance. The settlement may serve as an early test bed for certain possibilities, including digital distribution and access, and the imposition of limited formalities on rights-holders. However, as a private contract, it is an insufficient guide for legislative development. The trouble with copyright does not affect Google alone. The public interest demands more broadly applicable solutions, and these will be achieved—eventually, and possibly with great difficulty—through copyright legislation. We may get copyright reform wrong, as arguably we have done in the past, but that fear should be allayed if we also recall that we have the power to revise our legislative interventions until we get them right.

 

The Times paywall: what do the numbers tell us?

The preliminary numbers on The Times paywall are in … and no-one quite knows what to make of them.

Paid Content argues that while web readership has fallen off a cliff (as expected), the modest number of ongoing subscribes offers some hope for the future.

Roy Greenslade says its early days but the numbers probably don’t add up:

I am told that iPad numbers are “jumping around” all the time.

But there has been no attempt to counter my source’s view that there has been a measure of disappointment about online-only take-up.

Many people who tried out access in the early weeks have not returned. However, it is also true to say that some daily subscribers have been impressed enough to sign up on a weekly basis.

And it is also the case that the Sunday Times‘s iPad app has yet to launch. It is hoped that this will boost figures considerably, though I have my reservations about that.

I think, once we delve further into these figures, they will support the view that News Int’s paywall experiment has, as expected, not created a sufficiently lucrative business model.

Clay Shirky argues the paywall means a retreat from broad-based newspaper-style publishing to narrowcast newsletter publishing:

One way to think of this transition is that online, the Times has stopped being a newspaper, in the sense of a generally available and omnibus account of the news of the day, broadly read in the community. Instead, it is becoming a newsletter, an outlet supported by, and speaking to, a specific and relatively coherent and compact audience. (In this case, the Times is becoming the online newsletter of the Tories, the UK’s conservative political party, read much less widely than its paper counterpart.)

Murdoch and News Corp, committed as they have been to extracting revenues from the paywall, still cannot execute in a way that does not change the nature of the organizations behind the wall. Rather than simply shifting relative subsidy from advertisers to users for an existing product, they are instead re-engineering the Times around the newsletter model, because the paywall creates newsletter economics.

As of July, non-subscribers can no longer read Times stories forwarded by colleagues or friends, nor can they read stories linked to from Facebook or Twitter. As a result, links to Times stories now rarely circulate in those media. If you are going to produce news that can’t be shared outside a particular community, you will want to recruit and retain a community that doesn’t care whether any given piece of news spreads, which means tightly interconnected readerships become the ideal ones. However, tight interconnectedness correlates inversely with audience size, making for a stark choice, rather than offering a way of preserving the status quo.

This re-engineering suggests that paywalls don’t and can’t rescue current organizational forms. They offer instead yet another transformed alternative to it. Even if paywall economics can eventually be made to work with a dramatically reduced audience, this particular referendum on the future (read: the present) of newspapers is likely to mean the end of the belief that there is any non-disruptive way to remain a going concern.

 

Subsidising paid digital content: cultural policy, French style

Ars Technica notes that:

France has decided to try something… novel. The country will attempt to prop up the digital music industry by subsidizing legal music consumption by young people. Under the initiative, citizens between 12 and 25 years old will be able to purchase a “carte musique”—a prepaid card  usable on subscription-based music websites. The card will come with €50 worth of credit, but customers only have to pay €25. The rest will be paid by the French government.

It is interesting to see a national government try a subsidy where out-and-out regulation has failed. But will it work?

Axel Bruns maps the Australian blogosphere

A close up of the Australian blogopshere map generated by Axel Bruns.

Axel Bruns has extracted some 2.6 million hyperlinks and come up with some very pretty data mapping the Australian blogosphere for the first time:

what we’re already seeing in the network is a relatively large cluster of sites on the left of the graph, made up of sites (MSM as well as blogs) that deal predominantly with news and politics. In addition to domestic and international news sites, various Australian political blogs (such as Larvatus ProdeoClub TroppoJohn QuigginPeter MartinCatallaxy Files, and the suite of Crikey blogs) appear as prominent nodes in the network (on both the indegree and eigenvector centrality counts). Many smaller – that is, less prominent – blogs cluster around them, but receive comparatively fewer inlinks. There’s even likely to be some further subdivision within this overall cluster, but I wouldn’t want to speculate too much on this point until we’ve had a chance to further clean our data.

You can see the full post here and download the full-size, gorgeous mapping images here.

Jock Given

It’s time for a bit of fan post about Jock Given, Swinburne’s Professor of Media and Communications.

Why a fan post? Maybe it’s his recent in-depth dissection of the Australian Government’s implementation plan for the National Broadband Network. Maybe it’s his long review essay, also in Inside Story, about the future of books and print. Maybe it’s his fine monograph of 2003, Turning Off the Television, about the history and future of Australian broadcasting and communications policy.

In fact, any way you slice it, Given’s work has become central to this field. He’s got that rare combination of incisive analysis and clear, witty prose.

Take, for example, his discussion of the National Broadband Network, one of the best short introductions to this bewilderingly complex topic you’re likely to find:

WHAT McKinsey and KPMG have delivered is the most substantial public analysis of an Australian communications infrastructure project since the domestic satellite system in the 1980s. This is a major benefit, though not necessarily a good omen. AUSSAT racked up $800 million in debt within a few years. Voluminous public documentation doesn’t always lead to great decisions.

Indeed, in Australian communications, the size of the study is generally indirectly proportional to its influence. The bulky Davidson Inquiry recommending competition in telecommunications and the multi-volume Broadcasting Tribunal inquiry recommending the introduction of cable TV, both in the early 1980s, achieved close to zero. The Productivity Commission’s year-long inquiry into broadcasting in 2000 was largely ignored. But Kim Beazley’s few-page statement about telecommunications competition in 1990 blew the industry apart. By this standard, the two-and-a-half-page media release announcing the NBN in April 2009 was bound to change the world.

The McKinsey/KPMG study is testimony to the sea-change in telecommunications policy in the last two and a half years. For twenty years, both sides of politics have been getting the government out of the telecommunications business, first by allowing private competitors to take on the state-owned monopoly that ran the country’s telecoms for ninety years, then selling down the state’s ownership of it. When new mobile and fixed-line networks were built in the 1990s and 2000s, communications ministers didn’t pour over technology choices, costs, revenues, capital allocation and geographic priorities the way Postmasters-General used to do. Parliament had decided that governments made lousy decisions about those kinds of things.

At least, they weren’t supposed to be pouring over these things the way Postmasters-General used to do. The truth was they still did quite a lot of it. The Coalition government crawled all over Telstra’s timetable for shutting down its analogue mobile phone network and applied immense pressure on its plans to build and later close a CDMA network. In his bookWired Brown Land?, Paul Fletcher, chief of staff to long-term Howard government communications minister Richard Alston and now the Liberal member for Bradfield on Sydney’s north shore, says Ziggy Switkowski was not even on the shortlist of candidates for CEO until Alston insisted he be there. This was at a time when Howard and Alston were pushing their reluctant backbench to support privatisation. The government, they said, had no business controlling a telecommunications company.

But out in the new marketplace, the cable TV and eventually broadband network built in the mid 1990s by the new wholly private telco, Optus, didn’t work very well. The still-public Telstra proved more nimble and ruthless than some expected, building a similar network down many of the same streets. Both companies had to write off billions of dollars. It seemed telcos in commercial markets, even privately owned ones, could make lousy decisions too. Optus’s subsequent caution about investment in fixed-line networks and the curiously widespread, renewed enthusiasm for monopoly is the deep legacy of that time.

The government’s response has been to get back to controlling a telecommunications company. It is not the vertically integrated Telstra, it’s the wholesale-only NBN Co. McKinsey/KPMG’s Implementation Studycontains a set of recommendations that are not yet government policy, but it tells us a great deal about this new, old world.

We have a good idea – the best yet – about how much it might cost. We have lots of data and discussion about what it might earn in revenue. We have an argument about “viability,” but this is really an argument about whether the now fairly well-articulated financial returns that can be expected from the project are justified by the economic and social benefits that might not be captured by the financial modelling.

This is where faith and politics take over.

Simon and Schuster CEO: We still don’t get e-publishing

US e-book sales, 2002-2010. Source: Neilsen BookScan, International Digital Publishing Forum, AFR.

The Australian Financial Review, paradoxically one the best newspapers for coverage of the Australian cultural industries even as its own circulation dwindles away towards marginality, has an excellent article on e-publishing today.

In an ironic twist, you can’t actually see it online, because the geniuses at Fairfax are still firewalling their content the internet. (Great business strategy, guys). This means that the AFR‘s typically excellent Katrina Strickland is denied to web readers, just as today’s article by Emma Connors is.

No matter: you’re humble correspondent still likes to read newspapers and has gone out and bought a physical copy of one.

The article contains a long and interesting interview with Simon and Schuster CEO Carolyn Reidy.

In 2007 the New York based publisher began digitising 12,000 of its backlist titles, and creating a digital distribution network. It was a leap of faith that cost ‘close to eight figures’, says Reidy, who laughs when asked about the return on investment.

“I would say there has not been enough of one yet,” says Reidy.

“Some of those titles are not even available for sale as e-books because we are still clearing the necessary agreements with authors from the deep back catalogue, making sure the contractual work is done.”

The quotes from Reidy are not particularly groundbreaking, but what the article does reveal is how publishers continue to struggle with the cultural implications of the transformation of their industry – from a creator of bespoke physical objects, to the digital distributor of bulk creative commodities.  As Reidy tells Connors,

“We are trying to build on our experience physical sales to make sense of digital, but there’s no doubt we are experimenting. No one feels they have the answer yet.

We don’t know if we will sell more books overall because it is easier for people to buy online where they just have to push a button.

We are not sure if the cultural role books have played – one that is so central – will be maintained as the digital model progresses.

These are all questions that are coming up.”

In other words, publishers are a l0t like newspaper editors and journalists: in deep, deep denial.

I think I can answer those questions really quickly: Will more books be sold online? Yes. Will the central cultural role of books continue? No.

YouTube turns 5

Above: The Evolution of Dance, YouTube’s third-top all-time video and certainly one of my favourites.

It’s hard to believe, but the paradigmatic web video  site has now turned 5. The New York Times has an interview with Chad Hurley, while there  some other good links here, here and here.

YouTube serves 2 billion page views, but does it make a profit? Google doesn’t break down the figures in its accounts, but analysts still think the site may not yet be making money. Perhaps soon.

Big record labels sue gyms and win big

Gyms that play copyrighted music in Australia are up for a big hike in their licensing fees. Image: Chicagonow.com

Today marks another victory in the inexorable legal campaign for more licensing fee revenue by big Australian record labels, led by their industry body, the PPCA.

As Bellinda Kontminas in The Age reports today, the Copyright Tribunal has ruled that gyms must now pay significantly greater royalty fees to labels for the right to play copyrighted music to exercising gym-goers:

The decision, handed down today by the Copyright Tribunal, means that fitness centres will be slugged $15 each class for the use of the music or $1 per attendee of each class.
Gyms had previously been charged 96.8 cents a class, with a cap of $2654 a year.
Fitness Australia said it was “disappointed” with the decision which it said represented a 1500 per cent increase in music costs for an average-size fitness centre.
Chief executive Loretta Stace said it was now reviewing the decision to determine whether there were grounds for appeal.
She said record companies had “shot themselves in the foot” as many fitness centres were already starting to use music that was not subject to PPCA copyright.
Susan Kingsmill, owner of Hiscoes Fitness Centre, said music artists would would now be disadvantaged.
“This decision will lead all fitness centres to seek more affordable music alternatives to the detriment of Australian performing artists, but the artists only have the record companies to blame for this.”

For those of you not aware of the background of this case, it stems from a similar suit brought by the PPCA three years ago against the nightclub industry, in which the big labels similarly won a massive royalty hike. I covered that decision, and the opaque governance structure of the PPCA, in an in-depth article for Arts Hub in 2007.  Representing around 75% of the recorded music industry by sales, the PPCA is effect a legalized cartel (like APRA, it even has a special dispensation from the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission in order to operate as a monopolistic collection agency).

The decision is something of a win for the big labels, who have run into serious troubles in the past decade owing to high debt loads, falling CD sales, rampant downloading and an industry shift towards touring and merchandise.  It’s also another example of the increasingly skewed nature of copyright law in Australia, which is now titled decisively towards copyright holders, like famous artists and big publishers, and away from rights-users, like libraries, schools and gyms.