In New Matilda, Raena Lea-Shannon has an excellent summary of the arguments and judgement in the movie studios vs. iiNet case over internet piracy:
In order to prove the studios’ case, it was necessary to show firstly that there had been infringement by users, and secondly that iiNet’s failure to do anything about the notices amounted to authorising the illegal conduct of the users. While the Court was satisfied that the detailed forensic evidence showed that a number of users of iiNet’s service had infringed copyright regarding a number of the studio’s films, it found that the notices were by no means conclusive in all circumstances or easy to decipher:
“Regardless of the actual quality of the evidence gathering of DtecNet, copyright infringement is not a straight ‘yes’ or ‘no’ question. The Court has had to examine a very significant quantity of technical and legal detail over dozens of pages in this judgement in order to determine whether iiNet users, and how often iiNet users, infringe copyright by use of the BitTorrent system.”
The Court also remarked that these notices were not verified as an affidavit or a statutory declaration would be.[…]
In making this argument, one of the main cases upon which the studios relied was the Kazaa case, in which it was found that the operators of the Kazaa file sharing software had a vested interest in illegal downloading, and further, that despite the fact that not all activity using Kazaa was illegal, it was predominantly illegal file sharing.
In that case, the Court also took into consideration the exhortations made by Sharman Networks, the operators of Kazaa, to its users to join the “revolution”, that is, the illegal file sharing revolution. The studios argued that iiNet was no better than Sharman Networks, and that the entire internet was as much a hotbed of piracy as was Kazaa’s file sharing network; iiNet was letting its users get away with daylight robbery.
Justice Cowdroy considered the key cases governing this idea of “authorisation”, and while acknowledging some differences in their reasoning he drew from them what he considered to be the underlying principle of authorisation of infringement. Authorisation, he concluded, requires the authoriser to provide the means of infringement.
In another key precedent, the 1975 Moorhouse case, the University of NSW Library was found to have authorised an infringement by providing the photocopiers used to do the infringing; in the Kazaa case Sharman Networks provided the file sharing software.
However, Justice Cowdroy found that in this case the means of infringement was the BitTorrent system of file sharing — not the entire internet — and while iiNet made access to the internet possible, it had no control over how its users obtained and used BitTorrent and shared the studios’ copyright. “iiNet,” he concluded “has no control over the BitTorrent system and is not responsible for the operation of the BitTorrent system.” To press home the point and to conclusively distinguish these circumstances from the Kazaa case, he said:
“While the Court expressly does not characterise access to the internet as akin to a ‘human right’ as the Constitutional Council of France has recently, one does not need to consider access to the internet to be a ‘human right’ to appreciate its central role in almost all aspects of modern life, and, consequently, to appreciate that its mere provision could not possibly justify a finding that it was the ‘means’ of copyright infringement.”